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The past decade has witnessed tremendous growth in Chinese foreign trade.    The 
period was also punctuated by numerous important events that helped shape the 
patterns of Chinese foreign trade: huge inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
China, the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and the rise of Yangtze Delta region as a new 
engine of growth for the Chinese economy, to name a few.    The integration of the 
Chinese economy into world trade is closely related to the process of production 
disintegration in the world economy.     
 
Expansion of Chinese manufactured exports, some as a result of foreign outsourcing 
to China, and the important role of Hong Kong as China’s gateway to the world 
exemplify the new aspects of world trade identified 10 years ago by Paul Krugman 
(Krugman 1995), i.e., “slicing up the value chain” and the subsequent expansion of 
world trade and the emergence of super trading  nations.  One  year  later,  Barry 
Naughton offered a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese foreign trade in the first 15 
years since Chinese reform started (Naughton 1996), attributing the rapid growth of 
Chinese foreign trade to the institutional innovation of the export-processing regime 
and preferential policies towards export-oriented foreign funded enterprises (FFEs)
1.  
These two papers provide excellent institutional and economic analyses of Chinese 
foreign trade and its global environment up to 1995.     
 
The detailed empirical make-up of Chinese foreign trade was first revealed in a 
survey using detailed 1994 enterprise level trade data from Chinese Customs 
(International Trade Centre 1995).    It shows a rapidly growing number of exporters 
and importers over 1993-94, a low concentration of foreign trade in terms of 
individual traders, but a pronounced geographical concentration.    In addition, half of 
China’s trade in 1994 was handled by foreign enterprises, while their share in 
machinery imports reached 55%.    Processing exports (imports) accounted for 47% 
(41%) of total exports (imports) compared to 51% (30.7%) for ordinary trade; but the 
retained value of processing trade was much smaller, around 17% compared to 50% 
for  ordinary  trade.  Meanwhile,  the  main  formats of trade in the pre-reform era, 
namely, barter, border and compensation trade, only played a marginal role in 1994. 
 
Recently, two studies by CEPII researchers look into the pattern of Chinese foreign 
trade over time, using time series data from Comtrade (6-digit HS codes) and from 
China Customs with a total of four variables: trade products (2-digit HS codes), trade 
regime, type of trading companies, and trade partners.    Lemoine, et al. (2004) 
examine the evolution of Chinese trade patterns over 1993-1999, and show that 
China’s trade growth is directly linked to its integration into the international 
segmentation of production processes.    Through production sharing with Asian 
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countries and specialization in assembly operations, China’s manufactured exports 
have achieved rapid diversification.    Assembly operations have helped with 
technological upgrading of China’s foreign trade, but have only had limited impact on 
local producers’ participation in foreign trade.    Using the same data updated to 2003, 
Gaulier, et al. (2005) examine China’s trade in international dimensions.    They 
confirm the observations found by Lemoine, et al. (2004) regarding the relationship 
between Asian production fragmentation and China’s trade growth.    They also find 
that Asian trade is increasingly centered on China, with particularly significant 
changes in the trade patterns of Japan and the newly industrialized dragon economies 
(Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea).    In light of the deterioration of China’s 
terms of trade since 1995, the paper calls into question the sustainability of China’s 
trade growth. 
 
The ITC (1995) uses almost the complete set of Chinese Customs data but for only 
one year, while the CEPII studies use time series Chinese trade data over 1993-2003 
but with only four variables.    Therefore, the changing patterns of Chinese foreign 
trade in the past decade have not been fully revealed.    This is the motivation of this 
paper. 
 
Relevant Background of Chinese Reform Since the Early 1990s 
In the early 1990s, the focus of Chinese economic reform was shifting from the 
southeast provinces to the Yangtze Delta regions.    In April 1990, the Central 
Government decided to develop Shanghai’s Pudong District and to establish the 
Suzhou Industrial Park.    Deng Xiaoping’s tour of the south in early 1992 gave 
Chinese reform a much needed strong political impetus and after that, a series of bold 
reform initiatives were introduced, including extending the preferential policies and 
regulations, enjoyed by the Special Economic Zones established in the 1980s, to a 
wider area along the coast and the Yangtze River.    At the core of all those 
preferential policies and regulations governing various development zones are the 
autonomy given to local governments to approve foreign funded enterprises in a 
simplified and expeditious manner and tax concessions given to those FFEs.    Those 
preferential policies, together with the fine infrastructure for light industry, a pool of 
skilled labor force and a favorable geographical location, have helped attract a large 
amount of foreign direct investments (FDIs) into the Yangtze Delta region since the 
early 1990s.    According to China Statistics Yearbooks, from 1995 to 2004, utilized 
FDI in China increased from $37.5 billion to $60.6 billion.    The Yangtze Delta’s 
share of China’s annual total FDI inflow rose from 23.6% on average over 1995-97 to 
36.5% on average over 2002-03, while Guangdong’s share declined from 26.2% to 
20.7% for the same period. 
 
The inflow of FDI into China in the past decade was also motivated by external 
factors.    Production sharing between China and ASEAN has been ongoing since the 
late 1980s.    The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s left the ASEAN economies in 
a shambles.    In comparison, China was a much better alternative for FDIs that would   4
otherwise have gone to Southeast Asia.    Data from the IMF shows that during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, FDI inflow into China was increasing over time, while 
FDI inflows to key ASEAN countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Indonesia) were fluctuating and declining. 
 
Traditionally, Southeast Asia has had a strong trade relationship with the United States, 
exporting mainly labor-intensive manufactured goods.    FDI movement from ASEAN 
to China, as a result of the Asian financial crisis, also brought in their exporting 
capacity, as well as production linkages between China-based FFEs and the ASEAN 
economies.    Thus, FDI inflows reinforced the production linkages in the region. 
 
FDI in China is a key determinant of China’s trade expansion, for two reasons.    First, 
most FDI is engaged in processing and assembly trade operations--importing parts 
and components from abroad and exporting the finished goods.    These operations are 
generally supported by China’s processing trade regime, under which imports are free 
of duty and value-added taxes, and products using imported inputs are required to be 
exported.
2    This processing trade regime itself only facilitates but does not encourage 
processing trade.    Second, the additional tax concessions given to export-oriented 
FFEs encourage increased exporting.    This point is very well made by Naughton 
(1996, 302): 
 
“None of the concessions are unique.    All are observed elsewhere in East 
Asia and, indeed, around the globe.    The scale on which these provisions are 
introduced in China, however, is unusual.  In  most  countries,  such 
concessionary provisions are only applicable within a strictly policed 
processing zone.    In essence, China created a kind of gigantic export 
processing zone, defined not geographically, but by juridical status of the 
enterprise involved.    Although the SEZs attracted a lot of attention and were 
located near important economic centers in southern coastal China, they did 
not determine the extent of the export processing regime: export-oriented 
FIEs qualified, whether they are located in SEZs or not.” 
 
The above description applies for the first 15 years of the reform era, but powerful 
incentives for export-oriented FFEs remain as of today, and even more so with many 
additional incentives given by local governments. 
 
Competition among local governments to attract FDI and to create jobs and growth 
also plays a role.    Economic growth, FDI inflow and export promotion are not only 
on the platform of all China’s Five-Year Plans in the reform era, but are also key 
criteria for promotion of local officials (Li and Zhou, 2005).    Huang (2003) explains 
the inflow of FDI into China from a different perspective, arguing that failure of 
state-owned enterprises, institutional discrimination against private firms and 
fragmentation of domestic markets constrains the growth and investment options of 
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domestic firms, and create high demand for FDI.    As such, local governments have 
been giving additional concessions or preferential policies to FDIs, particularly those 
exporting FFEs, through cheap loans, free land use (often at the expense of farmers), 
subsidized energy supply and lax enforcement of environmental law
3, etc., and they 
serve as additional incentives for export-oriented FDI to go to China. 
 
As shown in the remaining part of this paper, machinery and electronics combined 
have experienced the largest expansion in exports.    Those products typically have 
low transportation costs compared to their value and are most suitable for production 
sharing.    As a matter of Chinese industrial policy, the two sectors have also been 
regarded as high-tech sectors and selected as key industries by several national 
programs to promote technological upgrading.    The electronics sector is largely 
dominated by FFEs according to various measures (Zhao, et al. 2007). 
 
In summary, in the era of global outsourcing, or “slicing up the value chain” in the 
words of Krugman (1995), China’s bold reform initiatives since the early 1990s, its 
shift of focus to the Yangtze Delta regions, various incentives given to export-oriented 
FFEs and the institutional innovation of the processing trade regime, explain the huge 
inflow of FDI into China, China’s expansion of trade (both imports and exports) and 
the rise of the Yangtze Delta in China’s foreign trade in the past decade. 
 
Goals of This Paper 
Against the domestic and international background outlined in Krugman (1995) and 
Naughton (1996) as well as new developments mentioned above, this paper provides 
a statistical and graphical analysis of key features of the Chinese foreign trade over 
the past decade.    Given that the United States is a key trading partner for China, and 
the U.S.-China bilateral deficit is the largest among all US trading partners, this paper 
also gives special attention to China-US trade when it differs significantly from the 
China world trade. 
 
This paper examines detailed Chinese Customs data for the period 1995-2004 (Yao, 
Dean, Hammer and Wang, 2006).    For easy exposition, this paper groups Chinese 
regions, trading partners and sectors into manageable aggregate levels, and produces 
graphs and summary statistics to illustrate its findings.    It does not try to reveal all 
stylized facts about Chinese foreign trade, but instead, seeks answers to key questions 
that will help reveal and understand the changing patterns of Chinese foreign trade 
and the driving forces behind those changes.    Links are established between FDI 
inflow and Chinese trade expansion, the regional and sectoral power horses behind 
Chinese trade growth are identified , and a picture of production sharing among China, 
its Asian neighbors and the United States is sketched.    The paper also explores the 
institutional innovations of the Chinese customs regime that help facilitate the process 
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of global outsourcing to China.    It examines the role of various specially designated 
zones in promoting Chinese foreign trade, and also shed lights on the nature of 
China’s apparent technology upgrading in its exports. 
 
This paper has three Sections.    The next section includes discussions of 11 topics 
that correspond to and appear in the same order as the 11 figures listed in the table of 
contents.    Section 3 concludes with a summary of the main findings. 
 
2. CHINESE FOREIGN TRADE: A GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 OVERALL TRADE PATTERNS 
From 1995 to 2004, Chinese foreign trade, defined as imports plus exports, increased 
from $281 billion to $1,155 billion, a growth of over 300% (figure 1.1).    Trade in 
agriculture
4, however, remained flat for most of the years and its share in total trade 
declined from 8.1% in 1995 to 3.6% in 2004.     
 
China runs a trade surplus in all ten years, which peaked at $43.4 billion in 1998 and 
has stabilized around $30 billion in recent years (figure 1.2).    Among all its trading 
partners, the data show that China had the largest bilateral surplus with Hong Kong 
consistently over the period, followed by NAFTA (United States, Canada and Mexico) 
and the 15 EU-member countries combined.    With the exception of Hong Kong, 
China ran a deficit with all major neighboring Asian countries and regions, including 
Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and ASEAN.   
 
Hong Kong is a gateway for Chinese exports to the world and the world’s exports to 
China.    Chinese customs data on exports to Hong Kong are overstated.    On the 
other hand, data on Chinese imports from Hong Kong do not have this problem, but 
have mis- or underinvoicing problems due to smuggling.    This asymmetry in data 
reporting on China-Hong Kong trade explains China’s surprisingly huge trade surplus 
with Hong Kong.
5    This gives us confidence that NAFTA, or the United States, to be 
precise, is the top surplus country for China. 
 
China’s trade surplus with the world showed considerable variability during the 
period.    In contrast, the Chinese trade surplus with the United States grew steadily 
over the period reaching $80 billion in 2004.    China’s soaring surpluses with the 
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NAFTA and EU-15 countries are mirrored by soaring deficits with all other regions, 
which makes Chinese trade balance with the world at a stable magnitude.    The 
patterns are consistent with the observation that re-organization of production and 
trade is accelerating and centering on China in the Pacific rim region (Lemoine, et al. 
2004; Gaulier, et al. 2005).    The data highlight the driving force behind the trade 
imbalance between China and the United States: China is increasingly becoming part 
of the global production chain, importing parts and components from its Asian 
neighbors and exporting processed goods to the United States and EU15. 
 
2.2 TRADE DISTRIBUTION BY CHINESE REGION 
Regions in this subsection refer to the Chinese locations where exports are originally 
produced or imports are finally consumed.    For composite regions, their grouping 
scheme can be found in appendix 2. 
 
For China’s trade with the world, the regional distribution of Chinese imports and 
exports are quite similar and therefore only figures for total trade (export + import) 
with rest of the world are given for the first and last three years.    Comparing figures 
2.1 and 2.2 reveals that the relative importance of Guangdong province was declining, 
while that of the Yangtze Delta was growing.    On average over the last three years, 
Guangdong, the Yangtze Delta and the rest of China each accounted for about a 
one-third share of total Chinese foreign trade. 
 
China-US trade follows roughly the same patterns in terms of the regional distribution 
of imports and exports and the changing weights for Guangdong and the Yangtze 
Delta.    Some differences are observed but mostly in magnitudes (figures 2.3~2.6).   
For Chinese exports to the United States, the shares of Guangdong were significantly 
bigger than the national average for the same period (52 vs 38% and 40 vs 33% for 
the first and last three years, respectively).    On the import side, however, 
Guangdong’s shares were significantly smaller and also declined only by a small 
margin.    It seems that the only significant changes in the regional distribution of 
China-US trade took place on the export side.    Finally, Northern China, which 
includes Beijing and Tianjin, accounted for a quite sizeable share of trade over the 
years (18~21% vs 9~11% national average), suggesting that imports from the United 
States were a bit biased towards the nation’s capital and its adjacent areas.    This may 
have something to do with the patterns of US direct investment in China that are more 
for accessing the Chinese market than for cheap labor cost, compared to FDI from 
other countries.    Because the quality of labor is a major concern, US direct 
investment tends to go to big cities like Beijing where universities and research 
institutions are located (Fung, Lau and Lee 2004).    As a result, investment-related 
US trade with China tends to go to big cities, such as Beijing. The distinctive patterns 
of US FDI in China may lead to similar patterns for Chinese imports from the United 
States.  
 
In terms of the trade balance (figures 2.7 and 2.8), Guangdong and Fujian generated   8
the most surplus with rest of the world (ROW) on average over the last three years 
and in this regards, Yangtze Delta was only at par with Shandong.    But for China-US 
trade, the Yangtze Delta was only behind Guangdong in terms of trade surplus in 
recent years.    In terms of the expansion of the China trade surplus with the United 
States, Guangdong and the Yangtze Delta contributed almost equally over time 
(roughly $18~20 billion). 
 
Rodrik (2006) argues that China is an outlier compared to other countries, as China’s 
export surge cannot be simply explained by China’s economic fundamentals at the 
national level.    But if we consider that more than 80% of Chinese foreign trade 
concentrates along the coastal region (figure 2.2) where higher per capita GDP, better 
infrastructure and abundant capital/skilled labor endowments are found relative to the 
inland, it is reasonable to conjecture that Rodrik’s conclusion would be different if 
those economic fundamentals were measured at the level of Chinese regions.   
 
2.3 EXPORT BY CHINESE REGION VIA HONG KONG 
This and the next subsection focus on the role of Hong Kong in China’s trade with the 
rest of the world (ROW) (not including Hong Kong itself), and in the China-US trade. 
 
Over the 10-year period, the share of Guangdong, Yangtze Delta and all other parts of 
China in the country’s total export to rest of the world changed in a way similar to 
changes happened to the regions’ exports to the world (including Hong Kong), i.e., 
the share of Guangdong declined and the share of Yangtze Delta rose (figures 3.1 and 
3.2; figures 2.1 and 2.2).    On average during the years 2002 and 2004, the Yangtze 
Delta accounted for 38% of Chinese total exports to rest of the world, Guangdong 
27% and rest of China 35%.    In comparison, Guangdong accounted for a larger 
though declining share of exports to the United States, down from 52 to 39%, and the 
Yangtze Delta’s share was slightly smaller but rising, up from 20 to 36% (figures 3.3 
and 3.4).    Roughly speaking, Guangdong and the Yangtze Delta were at equal 
footing in their exports to rest of the world as well as to the United States. 
 
However, in terms of the regional distribution of exports to rest of the world and the 
United States via Hong Kong, the positions of Guangdong and the Yangtze Delta were 
drastically different.    Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that overwhelming majority of the 
country’s exports to rest of the world through Hong Kong originated in Guangdong, 
rising from 88% over 1995~97 to 98% over 2002~2004.    Only a tiny percentage 
were from the Yangtze Delta, 2% over 1995~97 and almost none over 2002~04.    The 
share for the rest of China was also small and declining from 10% to 2% over the 
years.    Similar patterns hold for the regions’ exports to the United States.    In this 
regard, Guangdong was increasingly more integrated with Hong Kong in its exports 
to rest of the world and the United States. 
 
The dependence of Guangdong and other regions on Hong Kong in their total exports 
to rest of the world and the United States was declining, though Guangdong still held   9
the largest share.    Figure 3.7 shows a decline in Guangdong’s share of exports to rest 
of the world via Hong Kong in its total export to rest of the world, down from 77% to 
46% over the years; it also shows a decline of the shares for other regions, though 
Guangdong’s share was the largest compared to other regions.    For China as a whole, 
the share was 28% over 1995~1997 and 13% over 2002~2004.    In short, the role of 
Hong Kong in Chinese exports to rest of the world is diminishing.    Again, the same 
conclusion applied to exports to the United States but at slightly bigger magnitudes 
for all regions except for Guangdong (2002~04) (figure 3.8). 
 
As discussed in subsection 2.1, there are significant amount of goods that have no 
known final destinations when they depart China for rest of the world via Hong Kong 
and they are treated as Chinese exports to Hong Kong.    Therefore, the shares of 
Chinese regions’ exports to rest of the world via Hong Kong indicated in figures 3.7 
and 3.8 should be regarded as the lower bound and the actual shares are definitely 
higher. 
 
2.4 IMPORT BY CHINESE REGION VIA HONG KONG 
Referring to figures 4.1~4.4, there is a change in distribution of imports by Chinese 
regions from rest of the world and the United States, quite similar to that of exports, 
i.e., Guangdong’s share is declining, while the Yangtze Delta share is rising. 
 
Compared to discussions in the preceding subsection on exports via Hong Kong, 
findings on imports via Hong Kong in this subsection are quite similar and only differ 
in  magnitudes.  Specifically,  the  Guangdong’s share in China’s total imports from 
rest of the world via Hong Kong was smaller and increased by a smaller margin over 
time (figures 4.5 and 4.6); the share for Guangdong’s imports for the United States is 
even smaller and remained almost unchanged over years (Figures 4.7 and 4.8); and 
the share of imports from rest of the world and the United States via Hong Kong in 
total imports from rest of the world and the United States were pretty much the same, 
declining by a smaller margin over time (figures 4.9 and 4.10).    This suggests that 
not very much change has happened to the import side over time. 
 
Referring to figures 4.9 and 4.10, in terms of share of imports via Hong Kong in a 
region’s total imports from rest of the world, like exports, for all regions, shares for 
both rest of the world and the United States are declining; but unlike exports, imports 
from the United States were less dependent on Hong Kong than imports from rest of 
the world. 
 
It is worthwhile to take note of the smuggling issue, i.e., smuggling into China via 
Hong Kong, which has been the subject of several studies, e.g., Wong (1998), Fisman 
and Wei (2004) and Fisman, Moustaterski and Wei (2005).    Because of 
underreporting or missing reports, the above numbers understate the dependence of 
Chinese imports via Hong Kong, and should be regarded as the lower bound. 
   10
2.5 TRADE BY ZONE 
For various purposes, various zones have been created since Chinese reform started.   
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were created during 1980~88 to attract FFEs.   
Economic & Technological Development Areas (ETDA) were started in 1984 to 
substitute for SEZs, as well as to attract FFEs.    Since 1991, there have been several 
Hi-Technology Industry Development Areas (HTIDAs) set up to promote high-tech 
industries, which operate within a designated area in cities and target domestic 
high-tech firms.    To promote exports, Bonded Areas (BA) and Export Processing 
Zones (EPZ) were also put in place starting in 1990 and 2000, respectively.    All 
those zones accounted for 27% of Chinese total exports and 34% of total import in 
2004.    Still, the majority of Chinese foreign trade went to the nonzone area. 
 
It was also the nonzone areas that experienced the most dramatic growth in both 
exports and imports, compared to all other zones (figures 5.1 and 5.2).    Together 
with its trade balance (figures 5.3 and 5.4), these figures for nonzone areas closely 
resemble those for China’s total trade with rest of the world and the United States 
(figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3).    This indicates that nonzone areas are the contributor of 
first-order importance to China’s overall trade surplus and its surplus with the United 
States.  This  confirms  Naughton’s  (1996)  observation cited in subsection 2.2 that 
various zones do not necessarily determine the extent of trade growth. 
 
In figure 5.3, the SEZs do not show a clear pattern as far as the trade balance is 
concerned, wavering from deficits to surplus over years.    The ETDAs consistently 
imported more than they exported and the deficit grew larger over time, reaching $15 
billion in 2004.    For most of the years except 2004, the HTIDAs had a small deficit.   
This is not surprising because those zones were not meant to promote exports.   
However, when comparing BAs with EPZs, the two zones designated to promote 
exports, only the EPZs had a surplus since their inception in 2000, but BAs had a 
deficit in all years reaching $24 billion in 2004.    For trade with the United States 
(figure 5.4), all but the BAs experienced surplus in all years.    Clearly, how BAs 
operated in those years deserves further investigations. 
 
2.6 TRADE BY SECTOR 
Chinese foreign trade, especially exports underwent compositional changes over the 
10-year period.    As shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2, the most notable change was in the 
machinery, electrical machinery and parts (Mach/Electrical) sector: its share in total 
exports rose from 20% over 1995-97 to 40% over 2002-04.    On the import side, the 
change was small, up from 36% to 42%, during the same time span (figures 6.3 and 
6.4). 
 
A more interesting story was the trade balance.    As shown in figure 6.5, with regard 
to China’s trade with the world, the textile and clothing sector was the leading surplus 
sector, followed at a distance by the miscellaneous (Misc) sector (mainly toys and 
furniture,  etc).  The  Mach/Electrical  sector turned from deficit in early years to   11
negligible surplus in later years.    In contrast, for China-US trade (figure 6.6), it was 
the Mach/Electrical sector that contributed the most surplus, more than the sum of the 
surplus in textile and clothing and the Misc sectors. 
 
What can we learn about the debate on China’s trade relation with the United States 
from the difference concerning the Mach/Electrical sector in figures 6.5 and 6.6?   
Seeing the surge of Chinese Mach/Electrical exports to the United States, some 
observers argue that China is becoming a threat to the United States based on the 
understanding that the said sector is technology-intensive.    Others believe that the 
surge is the outcome of US firms outsourcing the labor-intensive operations to China 
in the sector--part of the vertical specialization of global production that has been 
increasingly prevalent in the past decade (Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001), and therefore 
it does not constitute a threat.    Indeed, figure series 9 show that surplus in this sector 
only appears under the processing trade regime.    Simple comparison of the two 
figures tends to support the latter argument.    If China’s trade surplus with the United 
States in the said sector is a reflection of China’s technological advancement, the 
surplus with the world should have been larger. 
 
Another related issue is whether or not one can rely on trade data alone to label a 
category of products or even a specific product as high-, mid- or low-tech?    The 
answer is no.    According to Abbot (1991), sectoral grouping based on SITC or HS 
codes that appear to represent a high-tech sector may actually cover plenty of 
low-tech products (e.g., computer sector vs keyboard, mouse,  etc).  According  to  US 
Census experts, even at the most disaggregate level, some 10-digit HS codes can each 
cover many heterogeneous commodities.
6   
 
The proposition that the surge of Chinese machinery and electronics exports is not 
necessarily an indication of technological upgrading in that sector is consistent with 
observations of other China experts.    Gilboy (2004) argues that the business risks 
inherent in China’s unreformed political system has bred an “industrial strategic 
culture” that Chinese firms focus on developing privileged relations with government 
officials, spurn horizontal association and broad networking with each other, and 
forgo investment in long term technology development and diffusion.    Lang (2006) 
examines the operations of several Chinese high-tech firms and reaches the 
conclusion that Chinese culture itself is simply not helpful in fostering the 
development of high-tech companies. 
 
To take advantage of detailed information of the 8-digit HS trade data, Chinese tariff 
rates at 10-digit HS codes are used to derive information on the technological content 
of a product in the Mach/Electrical sector, where,the applied MFN tariffs are normally 
low for inputs but high for final products.    This is part of China’s industrial policy to 
promote the high-tech industry.    Therefore, the level of the tariff rate can serve as a 
proxy for the level of technological content.    Using the 2004 Chinese applied MFN 
                                                        
6  Communications with Zhi Wang of the United States International Trade Commission.   12
tariffs and the 2004 data, simple averages of tariffs for three categories of imports 
(ordinary trade (OT), processing and assembly trade (P&A), and processing trade 
with imported materials (PWIM), for details see section 2.8) are  calculated.   
 
Tariffs for Chinese imports from ASEAN (1.2-1.6%) are lower than those from South 
Korea (2.0~3.3%), which again is lower than those from Japan (2.4~5.5%).    Imports 
from Korea and Japan also carry higher tariffs for ordinary trade.    If import tariffs 
can serve as proxies for China perceived technological contents of traded 
commodities as discussed above, Chinese exports show lower technological contents 
(measured with average tariff rates) for exports to NAFTA (mainly the United States) 
and the 15 EU countries than those to Latin America, Africa and Middle East.   
Among the three categories of trade with NAFTA and EU-15 countries, technological 
contents (measured with tariff rates) of P&A and PWIM exports are lower than those 
of ordinary exports, while for trade with other three developing regions, technological 
contents (measured with tariff rates) of ordinary exports are normally lower than those 
of P&A and PWIM exports.    For the Mach/Electrical sector, the numbers and 
comparisons suggest that (1) Chinese imports from ASEAN are more labor-intensive 
than imports from Japan and Korea; (2) Chinese exports to NAFTA and EU-15 
countries are more labor-intensive than exports to the three developing regions; and (3) 
Chinese processing exports to NAFTA and EU15 are more labor-intensive than its OT 
exports to the same regions, while the opposite is true for Chinese processing exports 
to the three developing regions. 
 
2.7 TRADE BALANCE BY ZONE AND SECTOR 
The significance of the Mach/Electrical sector in generating the China-US trade 
surplus can also be found in figures 7.1~7.6, where a comparison is made between 
China-World and China-US trade by selected zones and sectors.    For nonzone area, 
ETDAs and BAs, the said sector stands up to be the key difference between the 
China-World and China-US trade in terms of sectoral distribution of trade balance.   
It is the leading deficit sector or sector with negligible surplus for the China-World 
trade, while the leading surplus sector for the China-US trade.    But for all other 
zones, the Mach/Electrical surplus appears for both trade routes. 
 
2.8 TRADE BY CUSTOMS REGIME 
Chinese customs regimes can be broadly grouped into three categories: ordinary, 
processing and all other trade regimes.    Ordinary trade is the trade that does not 
benefit from special customs regimes and tariff preference, unlike the processing trade 
regime that was set up in early years of the Chinese reform when the country was 
eager to promote exports to earn foreign currencies.  Under  the  processing  trade 
regime, goods are allowed to enter China duty free, but the processed goods cannot be 
sold in China, but must be exported.    In recent years, it has become the main mode 
of foreign outsourcing to China, normally accompanied by FDI inflow into the 
processing  sector.  The  broad  processing  trade regime consists of two customs 
arrangements: “processing and assembling (P&A)” and “processing with imported   13
materials (PWIM).”    The key distinctions between the two are as follows: 
 
(1) Under P&A, also called lailiao jiagong in Chinese, “the factory in China plays a 
fairly passive role, taking orders and receiving materials from foreign trading 
companies;” under PWIM, also called jinliao jiagong in Chinese, “the factory in 




(2) Imported materials used for P&A are provided by the foreign firms with the 
Chinese side spending no foreign exchange for imports, while materials for PWIM are 
imported by Chinese firms to meet their own needs for processing. 
 
(3) The proprietary rights of the imported materials for P&A and the selling rights of 
the finished products belong to foreign firms, while the proprietary rights of the 
imported materials for PWIM and the selling rights of the finished products belong to 
the Chinese side. 
 
(4) In P&A, the Chinese side only takes responsibility for processing and assembling 
the imported materials according to the requirements of foreign firms and the input 
quotas and rate of depreciation fixed by foreign firms which are charged for the 
operations done.    The Chinese side takes no responsibility for the profits or losses in 
selling the subsequent products.    But in PWIM, Chinese enterprises shall arrange the 
processing themselves and shall take sole responsibility for their own profits or losses. 
 
In short, the foreign firms take control of the goods under P&A while the Chinese 
firms take control of the goods under PWIM.    Which of the two forms a foreign 
company take in its outsourcing to China has been the subject of a recent study on the 
property rights theory of the firm (Feenstra and Hanson 2005). 
 
Ordinary and processing trade account for the bulk of Chinese foreign trade and are 
the focus of this subsection.    As shown in figures 8.1 and 8.2, both processing and 
ordinary trade (exports and imports) experienced steady growth over years.    But 
processing trade dominated Chinese exports, while ordinary trade dominated imports 
in later years.    On the export side, processing exports led the ordinary exports by a 
big margin ($84 billion or 34.4% of the ordinary exports); on the import side, the gap 
was smaller ($26 billion or 11.7% of the processing imports in 2004). 
 
For China-US trade, as shown in figures 8.3 and 8.4, relative speaking, the gap 
between the ordinary and processing trade regimes has widened for both export and 
import (119.7% of the ordinary exports and 121.8% of the processing imports in 
2004), though not in absolute terms. 
 
In terms of the trade balance (figures 8.5 and 8.6), for both China-World and 
                                                        
7  Quotes come from Naughton (1996), page 300.   14
China-US trade, the processing regime consistently enjoyed surpluses over the years.   
For ordinary trade, however, the Chinese trade balance with the world slipped into 
deficit in 2003 and 2004, while Chinese trade balance with the United States kept 
rising, though far behind that under the processing regime. 
 
Figure 8.7 shows China’s trade balance with its Asian neighbors (ASEAN, Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan
8) and it is a mirror image of the China-US trade balance (figure 
8.6), as far as processing trade is concerned.    It suggests a triangle among China, its 
Asian neighbors and the United States in production sharing: China imports parts and 
components from Asia and sell the processed goods to the United States.     
 
Figures 8.8 and 8.9 further break the processing trade into P&A and PWIM to 
examine the trade relations of the triangle in details.    The mirror images between the 
China-Asia and China-US trade balance still hold.    China’s growing trade deficit 
with Asia and growing surplus with the United States, particular under PWIM in 
recent years, show the production linkage of the three regions are deepening and the 
PWIM regime is the driving force behind this process. 
 
2.9 TRADE BALANCE BY CUSTOMS REGIME AND SECTOR 
Figures 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 show that ordinary, processing and other trade regimes 
contribute to China’s trade balance in different ways.    For ordinary trade, the leading 
surplus contributor was textile and clothing sector (while the Mach/Electrical sector 
was running a deficit!); for processing trade, it is the Mach/Electrical sector; and for 
other regimes, almost all sectors showed deficits and most of the deficits were in the 
Mach/Electrical sector. 
 
The huge surplus in Mach/Electrical sector in the processing trade is consistent with 
our belief that outsourcing was the main reason for the export expansion in the sector, 
given the very nature of the processing trade regime as discussed in subsection 2.4. 
 
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 further break the processing trade into P&A and PWIM.    Still the 
two figures resemble the sectoral patterns for processing trade (figure 9.2), with the 
Mach/Electrical sector contributing the most to Chinese trade surplus with the world 
for each of the two subregimes under the processing trade.    In terms of magnitude, 
the surplus in Mach/Electrical sector under PWIM is almost five times as much as that 
under P&A.    Again, it shows that exports under PWIM are the driving force behind 
the growing surplus with the world in Mach/Electrical sector   
 
Trade balances with US follow the similar patterns. 
 
2.10 TRADE BY FIRMTYPE 
China has been liberalizing its restriction on trading rights.    In the early years of 
                                                        
8 Hong Kong is excluded because large amount of goods enter Hong Kong with unknown final 
destinations and it will distort the China’s true trade patterns with its neighbors.     15
reform, only government-sanctioned, state-owned trading companies had the rights to 
engage in international trade.    With the exception of FFEs, producers had to sell their 
products to those trading companies.    Over time, trading rights control was relaxed 
and more production companies were allowed to engage in international trade.    With 
China’s accession to the WTO, almost everyone can enter the business, except for 
some strategic commodities whose trading rights are reserved for a small number of 
state trading enterprises.    On the other hand, as part of the incentive package to 
attract FDI, since the early years when China opened up, FFEs have been granted 
special privileges in handling foreign trade within a prescribed scope. 
 
Given the above background clarification, Chinese foreign trade handled by trading 
companies, whose information are available in the data, should be interpreted as only 
a proxy for the trade handled by the production companies of the same type.    Among 
various firm types, FFEs have the best proxies as they enjoyed trading rights 
throughout the period of 1995-2004.    For privately and collectively owned 
companies (PrivCol), the proxies are improving over time. 
 
From figures 10.1 and 10.2, we see foreign owned and the private and collectively 
owned trading companies were gaining momentum.    On the export side, FFE 
surpassed the SOE in later years when the private and collectively owned firms 
(PrivCol) were also making headway.    SOEs remained relatively stable over the ten 
years period.    A similar pattern existed on the import side.    In this regard, China-US 
trade showed no distinct difference.   
 
In terms of the trade balance, however, China-World and China-US trade showed 
distinctly different patterns (figures 10.3 and 10.4).    For China-World trade, the 
surplus for SOEs in early years was shrinking and slipped into deficit in later years, 
while the opposite movement was seen for FFEs.    Private and collectively owned 
trading companies had almost balanced trade in 1995, but show a growing surplus, 
which becomes the largest of the three in later years. 
 
For China-US trade, all types of firms were gaining in surplus except the “other” 
group which remained flat with balanced trade.  The  performance of SOEs was 
improved but only at a slow pace.    They were caught up with by PrivCol in 2004, 
but both are still lagging far behind FFEs. 
 
In summary, the increasingly important role of FFEs and PrivCol in Chinese foreign 
trade and particularly the generating surplus is an outcome of adjustment to trading 
rights reform as well as the improvement in production and exporting capacities of 
those  companies.  Trading  rights  liberalization also made it possible to better discern 
from the Customs data the true extent of the SOEs’ role in the production of exports, 
which is second to FFEs and PrivCol combined. 
 
2.11 TRADE BY SECTOR AND FIRMTYPE   16
Again, the significance of Mach/Electrical sector in China-US trade can be shown 
here in comparison with China-World trade, by breaking the trade data by firm type.   
For all three types of firms (SOEs, FFEs and PrivCol), as shown in figures 11.1~11.6, 
the relative contribution of the said sector to the trade surplus with the United States 
was more significant than that to China-World trade. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
To sum up, Chinese foreign trade over 1995-2004 has the following key features: 
 
(1) The Yangtze Delta was catching up with Guangdong province in international 
trade.    Hong Kong’s role in China’s foreign trade was diminishing and almost 
negligible for the Yangtze Delta, but still quite significant for Guangdong. 
 
(2) Machinery and electrical machinery and parts were the single most important 
product category that helped reshape Chinese foreign trade patterns, particularly in 
China-US trade.    All indications suggest that rise of the sector in China’s foreign 
trade was closely associated with the country’s processing trade regime and the 
outcome of foreign outsourcing to China.    It is difficult to find any evidence that the 
export surge of that sector represents technological upgrading in Chinese exports. 
 
(3) The processing trade regime and foreign trading companies were playing 
increasingly important roles in China’s foreign trade development. Processing trade 
itself was increasingly dominated by the activities of processing with imported 
materials (PWIM) in recent years.    China and its Asian neighbors were all part of the 
production chain that produces for the US market.    China imports parts and 
components from its Asian neighbors and exports the processed goods to the United 
States. 
 
(4) Most of Chinese trade growth did not come from the specially designated zones, 
but from the nonzone areas.    This finding confirms the argument in the literature that 
China’s preferential policy towards export-oriented FFEs, regardless of their locations, 
was the key policy incentive for trade growth. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Figures        Figure Series 1: Chinese Overall Foreign Trade Patterns 
 
Figure 1.1 Total foreign trade (imports + exports)          Figure 1.2 Trade balance with rest of the world (ROW)   
      
Figure 1.3 Trade balance by trading partners   
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Figure Series 2: Trade Distribution by Chinese Region 
 
Figure 2.1 trade with row 9597                    Figure 2.2 trade with ROW 0204 










  Figure  2.3  export  to  US  9597            Figure  2.4  export  to  US  0204 





























































































Figure Series 2: Trade Distribution by Chinese Region (continued) 
 
  Figure  2.5                 Figure  2.6 











  Figure  2.7                 Figure  2.8 
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Figure Series 3: Hong Kong in Chinese Export 
 
    Figure 3.1 Chinese total exp to ROW w/ HK excluded, 9597     Figure 3.2 Chinese total exp to ROW w/ HK excluded, 0204 












Figure  3.3  Chinese  total  export  to  US,  9597          Figure  3.4  Chinese  total  export  to  US,  0204 
 





































Figure Series 3: Hong Kong in Chinese Export (continued) 
 
Figure 3.5 Regional Distribution of exp to ROW via HK, 9597    Figure 3.6 Regional Distribution of exp to ROW via HK, 0204 













Figure 3.7 Share of exp to ROW via HK in its total exp to ROW    Figure 3.8 Share of exp to US via HK in its total exp to US 
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Figure Series 4: Hong Kong in Chinese Import 
 
Figure 4.1 Total import from ROW w/ HK excluded, 9597    Figure 4.2 Total import from ROW w/ HK excluded, 0204 













Figure 4.3 Chinese total import from US, 9597              Figure 4.4 Chinese total import from US, 0204 
 



































Figure Series 4: Hong Kong in Chinese Import (continued) 
 
Figure 4.5 Regional Distribution of imp from ROW via HK, 9597  Figure 4.6 Regional Distribution of imp from ROW via HK, 0204 













Figure 4.7 Regional Distribution of imp from US via HK, 9597    Figure 4.8 Regional Distribution of imp from US via HK, 0204 







































Figure Series 4: Hong Kong in Chinese Import (continued) 
 
Figure 4.9 Share of imp fr ROW via HK in total imp fr ROW    Figure 4.10 Share of imp fr US via HK in total imp fr US 
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Figure Series 5: Chinese Foreign Trade by Zone 
 
Figure 5.1 Exp to ROW by Zone                  Figure 5.2 Imp from ROW by Zone 











Figure 5.3 Trade Balance with ROW by Zone            Figure 5.4 Trade Balance with US by Zone 
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Figure Series 6: Chinese Foreign Trade by Sector 
 






















































































































Figure Series 6: Chinese Foreign Trade by Sector (continued) 
 
Figure 6.5 Trade balance with ROW                Figure 6.6 Trade Balance with US 
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Figure Series 7: Chinese Trade Balance by Zone and Sector 
 
Figure 7.1 Trade balance with ROW for Non-zone            Figure 7.2 Trade balance with US for Non-zone 












Figure 7.3 Trade balance with ROW for ETDA           Figure 7.4 Trade balance with US for ETDA 
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Figure Series 7: Chinese Trade Balance by Zone and Sector (continued) 
 
Figure 7.5 Trade balance with ROW for BA              Figure 7.6 Trade balance with US for BA 
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Figure Series 8: Chinese Foreign Trade by Customs Regime 
 
  Figure  8.1               Figure  8.2 











  Figure  8.3                Figure  8.4 
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Figure Series 8: Chinese Foreign Trade by Customs Regime (continued) 
 
Figure  8.5               Figure  8.6 




















         
PSEJOBSZ QSPDFTTJOH PUIFST
 









































ordinary processing others  33
Figure Series 8: Chinese Foreign Trade by Customs Regime (continued) 
 










         
1" 18*.















   34
 
Figure Series 9: Chinese Trade Balance by Customs Regime and Sector 
 














Figure 9.3 Trade balance with ROW for “Others” trade regime 
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Figure Series 9: Chinese Trade Balance by Customs Regime and Sector (continued) 
 














































Note: Trade balances with US follow the similar patterns. 
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Figure Series 10: Chinese Trade by Firmtype 
 













Figure 10.3 Trade balance with ROW by firmtype            Figure 10.4 Trade balance with US by firmtype 
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Figure Series 11: Chinese Trade by Sector and Firmtype 
 
Figure 11.1 Trade balance with ROW, SOE                 Figure 11.2 Trade balance with US, SOE 
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Figure Series 11: Chinese Trade by Sector and Firmtype (continued) 
 
Figure 11.5 Trade balance with ROW, Private and Collective        Figure 11.6 Trade balance with US, Private and Collective 
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Appendix 2: Region Grouping Scheme 
 
Yangtze Delta      Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
 
Northern China      Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Shanxi 
(NChina) 
 
Southwestern China    Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Tibet     
(SWChina) 
 
Northwestern China    Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang 
(NWChina) 
 
Central China      Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Hainan, Anhui and Jiangxi   
(CtrChina or CSChina) 
 
Northeastern China    Heilongjiang, Jilin and Inner Mongolia 





Appendix 3: Sector Grouping Scheme 
 
2-digit HS    Descriptions (Abbreviation) 
 
01-24, 41-43   Animal and Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (AAgProdFood) 
25-27    Mineral  Products  (Mineral&Prod) 
28-38    Chemicals  &  Allied  Industries  (ChemAlliedInd) 
39-40      Plastics / Rubbers (PlasticsRubbers)) 
44-49    Wood  &  Wood  Products  (Wood&Prod) 
50-67    Textiles,  Footwear  and Headgear (TextilesShoesEtc) 
68-71      Stone / Glass (StoneGlass) 
72-83    Metals   
84-85    Machinery,  Electrical  Machinery and Parts (Mach/Electrical) 
86-89    Transportation  (Transpt) 
90-97    Miscellaneous  (Misc) 
98-99    Services 
 
The above grouping scheme is a slightly revised version of the one found at   
 
http://www.foreign-trade.com/reference/hscode.htm 
 